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Ranking Problems of Chattel Mortgages
and Civil Code Privileges in
Louisiana Law
Joseph Dainow*
This article deals with a limited kind of ranking problem
among claims which already have preferential status and where
the determination of priority requires the affixing of a date of
creation which is not supplied by the law establishing the privi-
leges. It is not within the scope of this article to cover all the
details concerning the privileges involved, nor is any considera-
tion given to the subject of recordation.
It might also be added that this article does not purport to
be exhaustive of the problems or the authorities, but it does
attempt to outline the nature of the principal problem and the
nature of any solutions.
I. PRIVILEGES UNDER THE LOUISIANA CODE
Theory of Privileges
In the civil law, the transactions which are intended to pro-
vide security for the fulfillment of a principal obligation are usu-
ally classified as being in the nature of either personal security
(suretyship) or real security (pledge, mortgage). A privilege,
which is one of the Louisiana security devices, gives a particular
creditor precedence before other creditors; however, it does not
fit into either of these two categories, although it comes closer
to the latter than the former.
Generally speaking, all a person's property assets can be
sought out by his creditors for the payment of his debts,' and the
general rule is that the creditors share ratably if the proceeds
are insufficient to pay them all.2 The whole subject of privileges
in the Civil Code is introduced, as an area of exception to the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3182, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 3183, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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general rule of proration, by the concluding phrase of Article
3183, ". . . unless there exist among the creditors some lawful
causes of preference."
The effect of this exemption from proration gives the priv-
ileged creditor an assurance of payment in full even if the ordi-
nary creditors get nothing. In this respect, the Civil Code privi-
lege constitutes a security device.
The subject matter of privileges is stricti juris, and no privi-
lege can be claimed without an express text of law either in the
Civil Code or in a statute.3 That is, privileges arise exclusively
by the operation of law, and by reason of the nature of a debt.4
The determination of which debts shall carry a privilege is
purely and simply a matter of legislative policy decision and the
purpose is to make this automatic security device accompany the
transaction so favored.
Reasons for Privileges
In the case of every single privilege, there is necessarily a
policy objective which warrants an exception to the general rule
of proration among creditors. The reasons are seldom stated, but
it is apparent that in many instances the privilege is created in
order to help a prospective debtor get credit which is not other-
wise likely to be extended to him.5
In some instances, the interest which needs the special
automatic protection of the privilege is that of the creditor, such
as the servant, 6 the clerk,7 and the artisan.s These persons are
presumably dependent upon their personal earnings for their
daily living.
A number of the Civil Code privileges must be considered as
having been established in the ultimate general interest, despite
the fact that a certain creditor gets the immediate advantage.
In this category are the funeral charges,10 the expenses of the
3. Art. 3185, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Art. 3186, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. E.g., Arts. 3191 (5), 3208 (supplies of provisions), Art. 3217 (1) (services
and advances for crops), La. Civil Code of 1870. Cf. 2 Planiol, Trait6 Rl4-
mentaire de Droit Civil 882, no 2544, 2570 (11 ed. 1939).
6. Arts. 3191 (4), 3205, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Arts. 3191 (6), 3214, La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Art. 3217 (2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
9. Cf. 2 Colin et Capitant, Cours de Droit Civil Frangais 944, no 1495 (10 ed.
1948); 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 880, 882, nos 2562, 2570.
10. Arts. 3191 (1), 3192-3194, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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last illness,1 and to some extent the law costs for the admin-
istration of justice.2
The privilege of the lessor 3 does not have to be considered
as established exclusively in favor of the lessor, because this
security device may well be the supporting reason for a lease
which might not otherwise be granted. Likewise, the privilege
of the vendor 4 may give as much help to the purchaser who
needs credit as it is an encouragement to business. And so on.
Ranking of Privileges
When there are two or more privileged debts which seek
payment at the same time, the determination of their competition
and order of priority is referred to as a problem of ranking. The
several privileges do not come together into one category for
proration among themselves, but there is another order of pref-
erence established among them. This order of priority has noth-
ing to do with the time of their creation but is settled exclusively
by their nature. 15 It is only privileges in the same rank which
are paid in concurrence, 16 and here again there is no significance
attached to the time of their coming into existence.
Just as the creation of each privilege involves a decision of
policy, so the matter of each ranking between privileges is a
policy decision. Despite a seeming complexity of detail, the codi-
fiers had a pretty straight pattern in mind for this part of the
law, and they followed it through in a systematic manner. An
analysis of the provisions concerning the ranking of privileges
under the Civil Code was published in a prior article, 7 wherein
it was pointed out that there are rules in the code for the settle-
ment of any ranking problem that might arise among Civil Code
privileges.
It was there observed that, unless otherwise provided spe-
cifically, special privileges have priority over general privileges
bearing upon the same subject matter, and that where a privilege
operates on both movable and immovable property it should be
exercised first against the movables before proceeding against
11. Arts. 3191 (3), 3199-3204, La. Civil Code of 1870.
12. Arts. 3191 (2), 3195-3198, La. Civil Code of 1870.
13. Arts. 3217 (3), 3218-3219, 2705-2709, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. Arts. 3217 (7), 3227-3231, 3249 (1), La. Civil Code of 1870.
15. Art. 3187, La. Civil Code of 1870.
16. Art. 3188, La. Civil Code of 1870.
17. Dainow, Article 3267 and the Ranking of Privileges, 9 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 370 (1949).
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the immovables.18 It was then shown that the chapter of articles
(3254-3270) on ranking was carefully divided by the redactors
into two groups: the one dealing with competing privileges on
movables (3255-3265), and the other with the ranking of privi-
leges affecting immovable property (3266-3269).19
Recordation
In order to be effective against third persons, some of the
privileges affecting immovable property have to be recorded,
but privileges on movables do not require any recordation.2 0 The
problems incident to recordation are not within the scope of the
present article.
II. STATUTORY PRIVILEGES
Purposes and Operation
From the point of view of the creditor, a privilege is certainly
a good thing; and a good thing is sought after by all who have the
means to do so. The excessive multiplication of new statutory
privileges inevitably decreases the significance of the original
idea of a special area of exception to the general rule of pro-
ration among creditors; the exceptions can become top-heavy
in relation to what was intended to be the rule.
Since legislation of this sort does not originate by itself, it
must be requested by interested parties. The interests with the
greater legislative pressures are usually the more successful. In
the course of time, a large number of new privileges got into the
statute books.21
As with the Civil Code privileges, each statutory privilege
involves two policy decisions: one, to create the privilege for
the debt involved and exempt that creditor from the general rule
of proration; another, to fix its ranking in competition with other
privileges. In the enactment of each of these statutes, it can
hardly be said that the legislators of all the various sessions had
in mind any consistent pattern for either the creation or the
ranking of these new privileges.
Ranking
Most of the privilege statutes contain a ranking provision
whereby the newly-created privilege is subordinated to a very.
18. Id. at 371.
19. Id. at 372-373.
20. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19; Arts. 3271, 3272, 3273, La. Civil Code
of 1870. See also Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, La. R.S. 1950, 32:701 et seq.
21. See La. R.S. 1950, 9:4501 et seq.
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few of the older code or statutory privileges, but with no attempt
to maintain any symmetry or comprehensive consistency among
the ever-increasing list of privileges. No attempt has ever been
successful in making one ranking list of all the privileges. It is
not possible.
With all this, most of the statutory privileges are ranked by
their nature and not by the date of their creation. In some stat-
utes, recordation is required, 22 but this is for the effective exist-
ence of the privilege and not for its ranking.
III. CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW
Scope and Development
The first chattel mortgage act in 191223 permitted chattel
mortgage on a small number of enumerated articles: lumber,
logs, and livestock. In 191424 the list was extended to include
vehicles, machinery, and certain oil well equipment. In 191625
more items were added to the enumeration, and since 191826 the
omnibus phrase including "all other movable property" has made
the Louisiana chattel mortgage law one of general application
and of very extensive use. Subsequent amendments and recon-
solidations seem to have been a frequently recurring legislative
process in order to take care of the various problems as they
developed. Among the more recent changes, the extension of the
chattel mortgage to "assemblages of things"27 and to "stocks of
merchandise" 2 broadened the scope of this security device be-
yond any of the earlier contemplations. Perhaps the most sur-
prising amendment was the very latest one, whereby the chattel
mortgage follows construction materials into the building itself
in certain cases.2 9
For the present inquiry, these details are not pertinent; how-
ever, two facts stand out significantly. Primarily, the use of the
chattel mortgage as a security device has pervaded every phase
of life and activity in Louisiana. At the same time, there was
created a new kind of ranking problem for priority between
chattel mortgages and other preferences.
22. E.g., under the Building Contract Law, La. R.S. 1950, 9:4801 et seq.
23. La. Act 65 of 1912.
24. La. Act 155 of 1914.
25. La. Act 151 of 1916.
26. La. Act 198 of 1918.
27. La. Act 172 of 1944.
28. La. Act 474 of 1948.
29. La. Act 50 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 9:5351.
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Ranking Provision
The arrival of the chattel mortgage into the law of Louisiana
brought a strong and increasingly frequent competitor in the
field of preferences against movable property. The chattel mort-
gage is effective against third persons from the time of its filing
for recordation;30 and in all its versions and revisions, the chattel
mortgage law has had essentially the same ranking provision that
"every such mortgage shall be ... superior in rank to any privi-
lege or preference arising subsequently thereto."31
As a basis for ranking between competing preferences, this
was a departure from the Civil Code principle of ranking privi-
leges by reason of their nature. Instead there was introduced a
new principle of chronological priority wherever a chattel mort-
gage was involved. Since the chattel mortgage laws came into
effect as legislation subsequent to the Civil Code, the ranking
provision of the chattel mortgage law had to prevail in all situa-
tions of competition.
It might be argued that, since the chattel mortgage is assimi-
lated to the Civil Code immovable mortgage for certain cred-
itors' remedies 32 and other rules not expressly covered in the
chattel mortgage law,83 the provision of Civil Code Article 318634
should govern so as to give privileges priority over chattel mort-
gages. However, the fact remains that this code provision was
promulgated in 1870 whereas the chattel mortgage laws are all
of much later date. And there is no escape from the basic rule
of statutory interpretation that in matters of conflict or incon-
sistency the later legislation supersedes the earlier.
Under the Civil Code system of privileges and their ranking,
the time of creation of each privilege was irrelevant and not
even considered. Accordingly, there are no provisions in the
code as to this point. When such code privileges (and most of
the statutory privileges) are found in competition with a chattel
mortgage, it is not only important but indispensable to affix on
each a date of creation, in order to get it into the necessary
30. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5354. See also Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, La.
R.S. 1950, 32:710.
31. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5354 (italics supplied).
32. La. R.S. 1950, 9:5363.
33. Durel v. Buchanan, 147 La. 804, 86 So. 189 (1920); Charrier v. Green-
law Truck & Tractor Co., Inc., 2 La. App. 622 (1925).
34. Art. 3186, La. Civil Code of 1870--"Privilege is a right, which the
nature of a debt gives to a creditor, and which entitles him to be preferred
before other creditors, even those who have mortgages."
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framework for ranking as against a chattel mortgage on the same
property.
In the absence of legislative direction, the courts have been
obliged to proceed on their own to meet these situations. In so
doing, they in turn have also been motivated by policy objectives
in reaching their decisions and in filling this newly-created gap
in the law.
IV. THE DATE OF CREATION OF CIVIL CODE PRIVILEGES
The Civil Code privileges are either special or general. The
special privileges on particular movables are more frequently
encountered and more likely to get into conflict with chattel
mortgages; the courts have had to fix a point as their date of
creation when litigation made a ranking date necessary. The
general privileges on all the movables of a debtor have not been
in so much competition with chattel mortgages, and there are
fewer judicial expressions as to their date of creation. An exam-
ination of the question of the date of creation will now be made
concerning the most important of the Civil Code privileges.
Special Privileges
Lessor. The existence of the lessor's privilege is dependent
upon two elements: (1) a lease between the parties,35 and (2)
the presence of the effects in the premises. 36 Accordingly, the
earliest point of time when these two elements concur is the
date on which the lessor's privilege arises. 37 This is not depen-
dent upon any rent being due;38 the privilege is protection for
a continuing relationship.
The lessor's privilege is predicated upon a lease; therefore,
it must be a particular lease. Consequently, if either by agree-
ment or operation of law there comes into existence a new lease,
that also means a new privilege with a new date of creation.
Thus, if the lessor and lessee (under a monthly lease for an
indefinite term) agree upon a change in the rent, they are deemed
to have made a new lease,39 and the privilege deriving from the
new lease cannot have a date of creation any earlier than the
35. Fisk v. Moores, 11 Rob. 279 (La. 1845).
36. Arts. 2705-2709, 3217 (3), 3218, La. Civil Code of 1870.
37. Youree v. Limerick, 157 La. 39, 101 So. 864 (1924).
38. Ibid.
39. McGuffln v. Barkett, 44 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 1950); Weaks Supply Co.
v. Werdin, 147 So. 838, and 154 So. 378 (La. App. 1933, 1934), criticized in Note,
9 Tulane Law Review 124 (1934).
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concurrence of the new lease and the presence of the effects on
the premises. This means that a chattel mortgage which came
into existence after the first lease but before the new lease
thereby moves into first rank ahead of the lessor's privilege.40
The most troublesome problem on the question of a new
lease has been in the case of "reconduction." Where a lessee
stays on after the expiration of an original lease term, without
objection of the lessor, there is a lease by reconduction,41 which
the court has held to be a continuation of the original lease and
not a new lease.42 The significance of retaining the original date
of creation for the lessor's privilege is apparent and preserves
his ranking over any intervening chattel mortgages.
The articles of the Louisiana Civil Code use language which
has been relied upon in support of the continuation theory for
the lease by reconduction.43 The French Civil Code uses lan-
guage directly expressive of the new lease idea.44 A strong argu-
ment has been made that the new lease theory would have been
appropriate in Louisiana because reconduction takes place only
where a specified term has expired and by reason of the general
principles of lease,45 and in fact an earlier Louisiana decision was
to that effect. 6 However, in the settlement of this question-
which appears to have stood the test of time-the continuation
theory has prevailed together with its obvious results. The deci-
sion to preserve the lessor's priority was clearly one of policy.
Since a lessor's privilege gives him a right of pursuit, against
the lessee's effects subject to the privilege, for fifteen days "after
40. Cf. Easterling v. Brooks, 213 La. 519, 35 So. 2d 132 (1948).
41. Art. 2688, La. Civil Code of 1870. "If, after the lease of a predial
estate has expired, the farmer should still continue to possess the same
during one month without any step having been taken, either by the lessor
or by a new lessee, to cause him to deliver up the possession of the estate,
the former lease shall continue subject to the same clauses and conditions
which it contained; but it shall continue only for the year next following the
expiration of the lease."
Art. 2689, La. Civil Code of 1870. "If the tenant either of a house or of a
room should continue in possession for a week after his lease has expired,
without any opposition being made thereto by the lessor, the lease shall be
presumed to have been continued, and he can not be compelled to deliver up
the house or room without having received the legal notice or warning
directed by Article 2686."
42. Comegys v. Shreveport Kandy Kitchen, 162 La. 103, 110 So. 104 (1926),
reversing 3 La. App. 692 (1926); McKesson Parker Blake Corp. v. Eaves &
Redditt, Inc., 149 So. 294 (La. App. 1933).
43. See note 39, supra.
44. Arts. 1738, 1776, French Civil Code.
45. Lapeyre, Tacit Reconduction-A New Lease, 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIsw
439 (1939).
46. Remedial Loan Society v. Solis and Trepagnier, 1 La. App. 164 (1924).
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they are taken away, '47 it has been held that the lessor's privilege
is lost after that time so that if the effects are later brought back
to the premises it is a new privilege which attaches as of the
return.48 There is some logic to this conclusion, but it can be
questioned as to policy. If a tenant sends out his furniture, house-
hold appliances, or other effects, to be repaired, and more than
fifteen days elapse before they are brought back into the prem-
ises, the lessor has only a new privilege; for no palpable reason,
he has lost his priority over intervening chattel mortgages and is
thereby effectively deprived of his security.
On the other hand, if there were as clear a policy to protect
the lessor's priority in this situation as there was in the recon-
duction issue, it might not be difficult or far-fetched to support it.
This might be done by taking the phrase "after they have been
taken away" or "have been removed" as meaning permanently
or without intent to bring them back, which is in all probability
what the original redactors of this rule had in mind.49
Vendor. The vendor's privilege arises purely and simply
from the sale, as an automatic security device for the unpaid
balance of the price. The date of its creation must then be the
point of time at which the sale as a contract is complete.50 Since
delivery to the purchaser is not essential to the perfection of the
sale,51 that element cannot be of any consequence in fixing the
time at which the vendor's privilege comes into existence.
A condition for the continued existence of the vendor's privi-
lege is that the object remain in the possession of the purchaser.52
There has been, and there may still be, some question as to
whether this means the purchaser's physical possession or legal
possession,5 3 although the court has given some indication that
47. Art. 2709, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Art. 288, La. Code of Prac-
tice of 1870.
48. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hand, 16 La. App. 488, 133 So. 466
(1931).
. 49. Cf. Art. 2102 (1), French Civil Code. The- French commentators con-
sider this right of pursuit as an exceptional right to protect the lessor's
security, and their observations seem to be predicated upon the situation of
removal intended to be permanent. Where things were returned to the
premises, no question could arise because no significance attached to the
date of creation of the privilege. 2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 854, nos
2478-2480; 2 Colin et Capitant, op. cit. supra note 9, at 962-996, nos 1533-1536;
1 Troplong, Privilfges et Hypotheques nOS 161-164 (3 ed. 1838).
50. Art. 3227, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also the statement to this effect
by the Supreme Court in United Credit Co. v. Croswell Co., 219 La. 993, 997,
54 So. 2d 425, 426 (1951).
51. Art. 2456, La. Civil Code of 1870.
52. Art. 3227, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. Comment, 4 Tulane Law Review 239 (1930).
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it means the former.5 4 Here, likewise, there is room for a policy
decision concerning the extent of protection for the vendor's
privilege.
A question might be raised as to whether a vendor has a
privilege if the issue is presented while the object is still undeliv-
ered. While there is no provision of law to the effect that he
cannot have the privilege under these circumstances, it might
appear inconsistent with the provision which preserves the privi-
lege only as long as the thing is in the possession of the purchaser.
At the same time, it must be kept in mind that if the date of
creation of the vendor's privilege were dependent upon the con-
curring element of delivery, it would be quite simple for the
purchaser to defeat the vendor's privilege by having a chattel
mortgage recorded while he delayed the delivery. Again, there
is a policy decision, on a point that was irrelevant under the
Civil Code system of privileges.
Artisans and Mechanics. The artisan's privilege under the
Civil Code 5 is a security device and therefore an accessory. Three
points of view can be taken concerning the time at which this
privilege comes into existence.
As an accessory, the privilege cannot exist without or prior
to the principal debt which it is intended to secure. The debt may
be considered as coming into existence when the artisan does
the work and supplies the materials as agreed between the
parties. A further division here might be between fixing the
date of creation of the privilege as of the beginning of the work
or as of its completion; and perhaps the stronger argument might
be made for the start of the work.
Another point of view would consider the principal obliga-
tion as coming into existence at the time of the contract for the
work, which would bring into existence with it the automatic
legal security of the privilege. The doing of the work is merely
the artisan's performance of his obligation under the contract,
just as the payment for the work is the owner's obligation under
the contract.
A third position might be that, since the artisan can have
a privilege only if the thing is "in his possession," 56 there can be
54. Pierson v. Carmouche, 146 La. 798, 84 So. 59 (1928). Cf. Milam Realty
Co., Inc. v. Jones, 7 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 1942).
55. Art. 3217 (2), La. Civil Code of 1870.
56. Ibid.
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no privilege until the thing is delivered to him in accordance with
the agreement between the parties. Support for this view might
be found in the argument that, if the owner changed his mind,
the artisan might have a good action for damages resulting from
breach of contract but could not obtain specific performance to
get the job itself.
This last view would be consistent with the rule that the
lessor's privilege comes into existence when there is concurrence
of the lease and the presence of the effects on the lessor's
premises. It might appear to vary from the position that the
vendor's privilege comes into existence at the time of the sale
regardless of delivery; however, the situations can be distin-
guished on the ground that the vendor's privilege is given essen-
tially to protect the vendor when the thing is not under his con-
trol but in the vendee's possession, whereas the lessor's privilege
and artisan's privilege are limited to the situations where the
lessor and artisan have some control over the thing itself by
reason of its location on their premises.
The statutory artisan's privilege which was introduced by
Act 341 of 194657 would seem to be subject to similar observations
concerning the date of its creation as of the time of delivery into
the workmen's possession, but the situation is not exactly the
same betause this privilege cannot be predicated upon possession
since it has a continued effectiveness for ninety days after the
performance of the work, and it would more likely be deemed
to come into existence at the time the work began. There would
be even more difference for the mechanic's privilege which was
introduced by Act 209 of 192658 because in addition to making
the privilege effective for ninety days after the performance of
the work this statute specifically excludes any relationship of
the privilege to possession by providing that "it is immaterial
where the automobile or other machinery may have been located
at the time or by whom the parts may have been attached."
Expenses of Preservation. The Civil Code fortifies the privi-
lege for the expenses of preservation with two species of rights.59
The creditor has not only an exemption from the rule of proration
57. La. R.S. 1950, 9:4502. This statute, as well as the one cited in the next
note, provides that its privilege shall have "no effect against . . . a chattel
mortgage previously recorded." This merely reiterates the basic problem of
the present article, because neither statute states expressly the exact time at
which its privilege comes into existence.
58. La. R.S. 1950, 9:4501.
59. Arts. 3217 (6), 3224-3226, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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and a very high priority among privileges ° but also a right of
retention which can be exercised against all other creditors. 61 In
competition with a chattel mortgage recorded prior to the making
of the expenses of preservation, the latter would have to yield
in accordance with the ranking provision of the chattel mortgage
law. However, this result does not seem to be in keeping with
the purpose of the privilege for expenses of preservation, and
the third person in possession may well prefer to protect himself
by not incurring the expense rather than expending the money
to protect the interest of the chattel mortgagee. 2
General Privileges
The general privileges on movables are enumerated in Article
3191 of the Civil Code.6 3 All the statutory privileges appear to be
special, that is, against particular movables, so that the list in the
Civil Code6 4 may be considered complete.
There is not a great likelihood of frequent competition be-
tween a general privilege on movables with a chattel mortgage
on particular things, but it is not at all impossible and has in
fact occurred. The first decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court
on this kind of a question was only recently rendered,6" involv-
ing the privilege of a secretary.
Clerks and Secretaries. In the recent case of Union Credit
Company v. Croswell Company,66 a secretary was given priority
over a chattel mortgage on the basis that the secretary's privilege
came into existence at the beginning of the employment relation-
60. Art. 3262, La. Civil Code of 1870.
61. Art. 3225 (2), La. Civil'Code of 1870.
62. But see Federal Mortgage & Finance Co. v. Bohne, 146 So. 173 (La.
App. 1933), where a mechanic tried to prime a prior chattel mortgage by
classifying his repairs as expenses of preservation.
63. Art. 3191, La. Civil Code of 1870:
"The debts which are privileged on all the movables in general, are those
hereafter enumerated, and are paid in the following order:
"1. Funeral charges.
"2. Law charges.
"3. Charges, of whatever nature, occasioned by the last sickness, con-
currently among those to whom they are due.
"4. Wages of servants for the year past, and so much as is due for the
current year.
"5. Supplies of provisions made to the debtor or his family, during the
last six months, by retail dealers, such as bakers, butchers, grocers; and,
during the last year, by keepers of boarding houses and taverns.
"6. The salaries of clerks, secretaries, and other persons of that kind.
"7. Dotal rights due to wives by their husband."
64. Including the widow's homestead ($1,000) under Article 3252 (last
par.), La. Civil Code of 1870. (No consideration is here given to tax liens.)
65. United Credit Co. v. Croswell Co., 219 La. 993, 54 So. 2d 425 (1951).
66. Ibid., reversing 47 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 1950).
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ship, even though no salary was in default until after the execu-
tion and recordation of the chattel mortgage. This reversed the
court of appeal, which had given priority to the chattel mortgage
on the theory that the secretary could have no privilege until
there was a debt of unpaid salary owing to her. The Supreme
Court held that the employment constituted a continuous con-
tract and that the privilege came into existence at the time of
the employment relation.
The court found encouragement for its position on this point
in the similar rule which recognizes the vendor's privilege and
the lessor's privilege as coming into existence at the time of the
contract and not having to wait until a payment has been
defaulted. The court's realization that a policy decision was
really involved found expression and comfort in the belief that
this must have been the original legislative intent because other-
wise the secretary's privilege would be defeated by a chattel
mortgage which had been recorded before any salary was in
default.67
An incidental issue in this particular case was whether an
intervening change in salary constituted a new employment con-
tract, thereby setting a new date for the secretary's privilege.
However, this was distinguished from the effect of a change in
rent in connection with a lease, and the basic policy of protect-
ing the secretary was effectuated.
Funeral Expenses. Under the ranking provision of the chat-
tel mortgage law, there is not likely to be competition between
funeral expenses and a chattel mortgage because the latter must
be established during the debtor's lifetime, whereas the funeral
expenses necessarily arise subsequently thereto. However, the
possibility of conflict is definitely present, especially by reason
of the rule that the privilege for funeral expenses covers depen-
dent members of the immediate family.68
Among the dates which may be considered as the proper
point of reference for the coming into existence of the privilege
for funeral expenses, would be: (1) the death, (2) the contract
between the debtor and the undertaker, (3) the burial, and (4)
the rendition of the undertaker's statement of charges.
67. "To hold otherwise would render the privilege valueless and sub-
ordinate to mortgages in many instances." 219 La. 993, 998, 54 So. 2d 425, 427.
68. See Art. 3257, La. Civil Code of 1870; Alter v. O'Brien, 31 La. Ann. 452
(1879).
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The death itself can hardly be the time at which the privilege
comes into existence because no choice has yet been made as to
undertaker or selection of materials and service desired. These
elements become fixed only when an agreement is made with a
particular undertaker; and therefore this point can more reason-
ably be taken for the creation of the privilege. The burial is
merely the performance of the service of interment and is not
the time at which any original obligations arise. Although the
rendition of the statement may be the first knowledge of the
exact extent of the debt, it can hardly be considered as the time
of its first creation for privilege purposes.
The foregoing analysis is pertinent as long as the conflict
between funeral charges and chattel mortgage is governed by
the ranking provision of the chattel mortgage law. However, the
policy question may well be asked as to whether this conflict of
preferences ought not to be governed by the same considerations
(decency, sanitation, and so forth) as the conflict between funeral
charges and the regular immovable mortgage, in which case both
the Civil Code and the jurisprudence have maintained the pri-
ority of the funeral charges over the mortgage.69
Law Charges. The privilege for law charges presents several
complications. The code provisions7" contemplate a number of
different kinds of items within the category of taxed costs, but in
some of the code ranking provisions, there is a specific priority
for costs incurred in selling the property 7 1 and in some instances
for costs of affixing seals and making inventories.7 2 It would
thus appear that for ranking purposes the law charges consist of
at least three groups, of which the costs indispensable to the
liquidation of the assets are given the highest priority. No
creditor at all can obtain his preferential payment until the
debtor's property is transformed into money, so these costs are
necessarily paid first of all, possibly even ahead of funeral
expenses. 7
8
The specific ranking provisions of the code expressly place
funeral charges, ahead of law charges,7 4 but this may have to be
69. Art. 3186, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Hardy, 11 La. App. 239,
122 So. 154 (1929); Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Succession of Brooks, 180 So.
170 (La. App. 1938).
70. Arts. 3195-3198, La. Civil Code of 1870.
71. Arts. 3252 (last par.), 3254 (last par.), 3256, 3262, 3265, 3267, La. Civil
Code of 1870.
72. Arts. 3263, 3267, La. Civil Code of 1870.
73. Cf. Arts. 3262, 3263, La. Civil Code of 1870.
74. Arts. 3191, 3254, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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taken to mean those law charges which were not incurred in the
sale of the property. Otherwise, the officers of the court could
refuse to incur the expense if it would be tantamount to their
having to pay the funeral charges. On the other hand, the Loui-
siana codifiers, both in the 1808 and 1825 Civil Codes,75 reversed
the order of the French Civil Code, which ranks all law charges
ahead of funeral charges; 6 and it may be that they really intended
to rank funeral charges ahead of all law charges just as they
stated in Articles 3191 and 3254.
The above discussion about law charges may seem irrelevant
to the principal issue of this article, namely, the conflict with
chattel mortgages. However, there may be something more to
the matter of separating costs of sale from other law charges
than what appears in the texts. As a practical matter, it is not
conceivable that a chattel mortgage would not have to accept
subordination to the costs incurred in selling the property
involved. Yet these costs of sale are necessarily the most recent
in point of time and under the ranking provision of the chattel
mortgage law they would be primed because they "arise subse-
quently."
If the chattel mortgagee is the plaintiff in a foreclosure, he
finds as a practical matter that he may not be able to get the
wheels of justice into motion until he himself puts up the money
for the costs before the property is even seized. If the chattel
mortgagee is the intervenor successfully claiming a priority, he
will find the law charges-at least the costs of sale-ranked ahead
of him in the distribution of the proceeds. 7 These situations
seem to be accepted much more clearly in actual practice than
they are spelled out in the texts of law.
Law charges include quite a variety of kinds of items, and it
would hardly be satisfactory to reason out, as well as impractical
to administer, bases for classification as to the inception of the
privilege that attaches in each case (for example, the commence-
ment of a lawsuit for all the costs duly incurred therein, or the
opening of a succession for the costs of administration). It might
appear simpler to legislate all taxed law costs into one category
as the first privilege, ranking ahead of all others, with no excep-
75. La. Civil Code of 1808, Art. 73, p. 428; Art. 3158, La. Civil Code of 1825.
See Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, Art. 3191.
76. Art. 2101, French Civil Code.
77. Cf. Federal Mortgage & Finance Co. v. Bohne, 146 So. 173 (La. App.
1933) (re storage charges).
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tion; however, neither this nor any other proposal is likely to be
satisfactory to everybody.
Expenses of Last Illness. The last illness is still defined in
the Civil Code as "that of which the debtor died."7 8 Since there
is no certainty of a privilege until the patient dies, it might be
argued that the time of death is the earliest inception of the privi-
lege. This would not be in keeping with the code provisions
which expressly contemplate an earlier date of creation. Al-
though no privilege exists until the death, the fact of death has
a retroactive effect in creating the privilege for the expenses
incurred during the preceding period. In the case of a chronic
illness, "the privilege shall only commence from the time when
the malady became so serious as to prevent the deceased
from attending to his business and confined him to his bed or
chamber."79
Accordingly, it would seem that the date of inception of the
privilege for expenses of last illness would be the beginning of
the relationship out of which the charges arose. Thus, it would
be the date of entering the hospital for the hospital charges, the
date of engaging the physician for the medical services, the date
of purchase for cost of medicines, and so forth. Such a system
might sound reasonable and logical, but it could result in a
curious inconsistency. If there were a chattel mortgage subse-
quent to some of the expenses but prior to others, it would sepa-
rate the different expenses of last illness for ranking purposes
among themselves. This would be contrary to the general prin-
ciple of Article 3188, which ranks concurrently all privileges of
the same kind, and directly opposed to Article 3191 (3), which
expressly ranks concurrently all charges occasioned by the last
sickness.
By providing an automatic legal security device, the policy
underlying this Civil Code privilege is to encourage the rendition
of necessary services to a sick person who may not have the
means or the credit standing to obtain them otherwise. To fit in
with the general policies and with the developing pattern of the
law, it would seem that the proper point of inception for this
78. Art. 3199, La. Civil Code of 1870; Succession of Whitaker, 7 Rob. 91
(La. 1844). Louisiana borrowed this provision from French law; but France
has in the meantime corrected the incongruity by granting the privilege for
expenses of last (most recent) illness, whatever its outcome, in a law of
30 November 1892 amending Article 2101 (3) of the French Civil Code; see
2 Planiol, op. cit. supra note 5, at 881, no 2558.
79. Art. 3200, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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privilege would be the beginning 0 of the illness which necessi-
tated all the expenses. However, in any event, this date could
not be more than "one year before the decease" because that is
the limit of the privilege granted by the code.8'
Wages of Servants. The privilege granted to servants and
domestics8 2 is so similar to the privilege of clerks and secretaries
that little discussion is needed to give it the same date of creation
at the time of the commencement of the employment relation.
It must be kept in mind, however, that there is an express limi-
tation on the extent of. the privilege of the secretary 3 and that
the privilege of servants is likewise and expressly limited to the
past year and so much as is due for the current year.8 4
Supplies of Provisions. Here also there is a limitation on the
extent of the privilege, this time to the supplies furnished during
the past six months for retail dealers, 5 and for the past year and
the current year in case of keepers of boarding houses and tav-
erns.8 6 The privilege covers the entire indebtedness as a single
unit; it would not be in keeping with the purpose or provisions of
the Civil Code to consider each purchase as a separate transaction
with a series of separate privileges for each.
Therefore, to effectuate the code policy, this privilege should
be considered as coming into existence at the time of the estab-
lishment between the parties of the relationship for the furnish-
ing of the supplies, but not to exceed the limits expressly indi-
cated in the code.
Widow's Homestead. The privilege granted to the widow in
necessitous circumstances can hardly be considered as coming
into existence at any time other than the death of the husband.
Both the right and the accessory privilege are dependent upon
the circumstances which have to be necessitous at the time of
the death. If there were any conflict with a chattel mortgage,
the latter would prevail because the widow's claim would always
"arise subsequently thereto." In any event, the widow's privilege
is expressly subordinated to "conventional mortgages" in the
80. By objective symptoms, medical diagnosis, or first expenditure?
81. Art. 3201, La. Civil Code of 1870. But see dictum in Succession of
Felps, 191 So. 738 (La. App. 1939).
82. Arts. 3191 (4), 3205-3207, La. Civil Code of 1870.
83. Art. 3214, La. Civil Code of 1870.
84. Art. 3206, La. Civil Code of 1870.
85. Art. 3209, La. Civil Code of 1870.
86. Art. 3213, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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text of its creation.8 7 The omission of this subordination in Article
3254, which contains an order of ranking for general privileges
on movables, might be argued as a distinction from the ranking
provision in Article 3252, which also affects immovables; but this
would not change the fact that the chattel mortgage law is still
the later legislation and that the widow's homestead privilege
would necessarily arise subsequently to the chattel mortgage
involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Each rule for the ranking of claims among preferred creditors
is a policy decision made, or to be made, by the legislature or by
the courts. When promulgated by the legislature, there need not
be stated any rhyme or reason for the rule in order to give it
effect. When worked out judicially by the court, a rule must
be consistent with existing law and be able to fit into its basic
pattern. The range of legislative policy decisions is accordingly
greater than that of the courts-although it would be expected
that the same considerations should apply in very large measure.
Under the Civil Code system, privileges constitute a very
limited kind of exception to the general rule of proration among
creditors. And as between the two lawful causes of preference
among creditors, s8 privileges were ranked higher than mortgages 9
without any reference to the date of creation of either.
The statutory privileges have now multiplied the lists of
exceptions to such an extent that they have cut down consider-
ably on the original significance of privileges, and the chattel
mortgage law has cut across a good deal of the original area of
preference. The total result is that there exist gaps and incon-
sistencies in the law. Quite a number of policy decisions will
have to be made and clarified before a comprehensive and a clear
system of ranking of preferences can be properly established.
87. Art. 3252 (last par.), La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 242
of 1918.
88. Art. 3184, La. Civil Code of 1870.
89. Art. 3186, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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